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# The Management of the War.

By
Francis Hare

VESTC

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES



THE

# Management

OF THE

# WAR.

IN A

# LETTER

TO

# A *Tory*-Member.

*Bella geri* placuit *nullos habitura triumphos.*

*LONDON:*

Printed for *A. Baldwin*, near the *Oxford-Arms* in *Warwick-Lane.* 1711.

THE

# MAP.

A

# LETTER

TO

A Two-Nicnibe

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*Nov.* 23, 1710.

*SIR,*

AS little as I love Scandal, whatever ſide it comes from, I have prevail'd with my ſelf, in Obedience to your Commands, to run over the Bundle you ſent me; and knowing you to be a Perſon of that Integrity and Honour, as to have more regard to Truth than Party, I will without more Ceremony give you my Thoughts as you deſire, upon ſuch Parts of them as relate to the Management of the War, which I hope you will find not to be the leſs true or juſt for the Haſte they are writ in; for plain Truths need no Diſguiſe; Fiction and Ornament are of no Advantage, but when they ſerve a Cauſe, that can't bear to be ſeen in its true Light. This I hope will be Excuſe enough, for the many Marks of Haſte and Negligence you will meet with in this long Letter.

You won't expect I ſhould conſider each of theſe Papers by themſelves, that would be giving too much trouble to one, who, I know, is too good a Judge to think them of ſo much Conſequence; *The Letter to the Examiner* is a mere Declamation, and conſider'd in that View is a pretty ſmart Performance, and you may read it to be entertain'd, but not to be inform'd; there is ſome Fire and Imagination,

but no Reasoning, Judgment or Experience, plain Marks of a young Writer, who may in time ripen into something considerable, and come up to the Author of *Arlus and Odolphus*, which is the Fiction of a more able Writer, and has the Beauties of a tolerable Romance; and to shew the Skill of the Author, is very happily call'd a *Secret History*; which is a Cover for all the Lyes the Father of them can invent, since that Name immediately forbids all asking of Questions; for were the Proofs to be produc'd, where would be the Secret? I can't say, I was so well pleas'd with Sir *Thomas*, which I found so dull and tedious, 'twas impossible to get thro' it, there is, by all I could see, neither Decorum nor Argument, nor Life in it; the Author shews he was sadly put to it for Matter, when he is forc'd, to make up his Invective, to take in the Compass of 22 Years, the fatal Period some among us are so angry with, that is 18 more, than the present Change is concern'd in; for 'tis but four Years at most, that his Principals *pretend* to think (for think they don't, as I shall shew you by and by) that the Management of Affairs has been wrong. In short, 'tis a stupid unnatural Piece, and what made me more sick of it, I have been told, 'tis as ungrateful as 'tis senseless, writ by a Man, who owes his Bread to those, whom he has with so much Venome drawn his Pen against. I don't know whether you will agree with me, when I tell you, I think the *Letter from a Foreign Minister* the most artful Performance of them all; the rest seem to be the Works of under Agents, from Directions and Hints mark'd out for them; but this I take

to

to be the Work of the chief Operator himself; who, if he was not at leisure to write more largely, has in this short Piece sufficiently shewn, what a Right he has to the Esteem the World have long had for him; there being in it some quick and crafty Turns, and an affected Appearance of Fairness, with which he gilds over the blackest Poison of Malice and *Invention*. You'll see I use that last Word in the modern Sense of it; and in my Mind the whole Letter is well enough contriv'd, to answer its Design; which plainly is, to please Friends, take off Enemies, amuse and quiet all, who are not acquainted with Affairs, nor enter into Patties, but by the new *Scheme* might be apt to be alarm'd. *Faults on both sides* has, to my thinking, a good deal of plain common Sense in it, which Experience has all along justify'd, and I dare say always will. And common Sense at this time of Day, I take to be a great Commendation to a Paper, and that this Writer seldom looses sight of, except where his Cause obliges him to quit it; which it does in several places, but no where more than where he speaks of Credit, all which is as mean, as the late *Essay* upon that Subject; and that I take to be the most affected uncommon mysterious Piece of Nonsense, even this wonderful Year has produc'd.

Taking these Papers together, there is one thing in them, for which I mightily admire the able Architect, under whom they have all been form'd; and that is the Difference of Spirit one sees in them, according to the several sorts of Readers they are intended to impose on. One makes great Court to the *To-*

*ries*, another is to gain the *Whigs*, or divide them at leaſt, others pretend mightily to Moderation; to catch the Men that have Honeſty and Temper, and have not engag'd far in either Party; others ſeem chiefly deſign'd to impoſe on Foreigners, and make them believe, all we have been doing theſe ſix Months, is only a perſonal Buſineſs, that can have no Influence on the Publick; that therefore the Allies, particularly the *Dutch*, and the Houſe of *Hanover*, ſhould not be alarm'd to ſee thoſe Men diſgrac'd, who, whatever other Faults they may have, never lay under the Suſpicion of favouring Popery and *France*; but have been ever true to the Revolution: have always gone into Meaſures for a vigorous Proſecution of the War, and have conſtantly been ſtruggling to gain new Securities for the Defence of the Proteſtant Succeſſion.

The various Shapes of this Poſture-Maſter in Politicks, make this Bundle of Papers, methinks, if you will pardon the Compariſon, not much unlike a Pedler's Rare-Show, in which there is a great Number of very different Figures, all in Motion at once; which the gaping Spectators think there is ſome ſtrange Magick in, and that the Spring of Action is in themſelves; when in Truth they are nothing but the Pedler's Engines, mov'd all by one and the ſame ſecret Hand, and all contriv'd for the ſame End, to delude and cheat the Multitude. And what is ſtill more ſurpriſing, this great Maſter himſelf has in his own Perſon acted, and that at the ſame time, all the different Parts, which his Tools in their Writings have but copy'd from him. But

what-

whatever various Figures these Engines of his Affect to move in, and whatever different ways they take, they all make to the same End, and agree in those Parts, of which you desire my Opinion, I mean in censuring the Management of the War, and endeavouring to ruin the Reputation of those, who have been hitherto the chief Directors of it. Upon which Head all they say, may be reduc'd to these four Points.

1*st*. That a good Peace might have been had at the end of the *Ramellies* Campaign.

2*dly*. That the War in *Spain* has been shamefully neglected, tho' the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief thing we propos'd by entring into the War.

3*dly*. That pushing the War in *Flanders* was pushing it in the wrong Place, *France* being cover'd on that side with so strong a Frontier.

4*thly*. That it is many ways apparent, that the Duke of *Marlborough* has unnecessarily prolong'd the War for his own Interest.

Now if it can be shewn, that these terrible Accusations are not only false in themselves, but certainly known to be so by the Authors of them, I leave it to you, to consider, what Regard ought to be had to such Men, or what Treatment they deserve; who have so grosly imposed upon the Nation, to the apparent Hazard of its Safety, and of losing all the Fruits we might hope for, from a War, that has been hitherto conducted with so much Glory and Success.

To clear these great Points, we are desir'd, it seems, to go no farther back than the four last Years at most; in truth 'tis not much above

bove three that there is any Diſpute about: Till then, all is allow'd to have gone well for certain Reaſons, that held good, till about the time, that the *French* King diſmiſs'd Monſieur *Chamillard* from the Finances, for no other Reaſon, that I have ever heard, but to ſhew us what we ought to have done here at the ſame time; and 'twas not the Fault of thoſe, who have play'd their Game better ſince, that we did not. This was in *February*, 170$\frac{7}{8}$, all the Complaints we have heard of the Management of the War, are from the beginning of that Year, but without much Noiſe till theſe laſt ſix Months. Since then we have been told, every thing relating to the War is wrong, and are fill'd with loud Clamours of Grievances, which before went abroad in gentle Whiſpers only, or were not at all heard of. And——

*Firſt*, They tell us, a Good Peace might have been had at the End of the *Ramellies* Campaign.

Now to decide this Queſtion, we muſt firſt ſettle what a Good Peace is; and in order to that muſt conſider, what it was we went into the War for. No body wants to be told, that this was chiefly to obtain theſe two Ends, the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and the procuring of a good Barrier againſt *France* on the ſide of the *Netherlands*. Without which two Points there can be no Security for *Great-Britain*, that their beſt Trade will not be loſt, and with it their Religion and Government, and every thing that is dear to them; for we ſhould every Minute be in danger of having the Bigotry, Slavery and

and Poverty of *France* forc'd upon us, by the exorbitant Power of that moſt arbitrary Prince, if he ſhould be ſuffer'd to ſtrengthen himſelf with the Addition of that vaſt Monarchy, who was before much too Great for his Neighbours; to ſay nothing of the Safety of the *Dutch*, or the Liberty of *Europe*; the laſt of which moſt of us, I fear, have little or no Senſe of; and for the Safety of the *Dutch*, ſo fatal a Deluſion has poſſeſt many of us, that one may every Day meet with Men, who are ſilly enough to wiſh againſt it. Now the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, the Reſtitution of which is the firſt Article of the Grand Alliance, is known by every body to conſiſt, beſides the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, of theſe two great Parts, of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and of *Milan*, *Naples* and *Sicily*, with *Sardinia*, and the adjacent Iſles. And a good Barrier againſt *France* means at leaſt a better than the *Dutch* had before; which by the Experience of fifty Years has been found to be much too weak for ſo large a Frontier; the *Spaniſh Flanders* and its Capital City *Gand*, having in truth no Cover at all; and *Brabant* but a very poor one; while the *French* being intire Maſters of the *Lys* and *Schelde*, both Provinces lie expos'd to their Invaſions. Look but on ſome large Maps of theſe Provinces, ſuch as have been printed of late Years, and your own Eyes will preſently convince you of the Truth of this. But if this Reſtitution and this Barrier were thought neceſſary at our ent'ring into the War, no body, I preſume, will ſay, they are leſs neceſſary now, when ſo much more has been done to gain theſe Ends, than any body at the Beginning

ning could ever hope to see. And if these two Points are necessary, then no Peace without them can be a Good Peace. Let us then compare this Good Peace with what the *French* offer'd at the end of the *Ramellies* Campaign; which is so far from being a Secret, that the Letters written to the Maritime Powers by the Elector of *Bavaria*, who was employ'd by the King of *France* to make the first Overture, were immediately communicated to all the Allies, and by their Consent made publick: And who-ever will be at the Pains to look back to the News Papers, and Monthly Accounts of that Time, or will consult even the common Yearly Collections, will see there is no Mystery in the Whole of that Affair; which, in short, is no more than this, that the *French* offer'd to give up to the Allies, which of these two they lik'd best, either *Spain* and the *Indies*; or *Milan*, *Naples* and *Sicily*, &c. Which Offer was unanimously rejected.

I suppose, there is no need of proving, that the Allies ought not to have accepted either Part of this Alternative, it being so short of what upon our Ent'rance into the War was thought necessary. To have been content with a Moiety of what we went into the War for, after so many Successes, and not a few surprizingly Great, would have rend'red us inexcusable to all Posterity; and some body, who, we are now told, prolongs the War, would have been said to have been well paid for such a Peace; 'twould have been in the Language of the Faction, a plain Case we were sold to *France*, and nothing less than his Head could have

have aton'd for it. But instead of proving the Absurdity of accepting such a Peace, I shall shew you rather, what to every body is not so plain; and that is, that the *French* were not sincere; they meant nothing by their Offer but to amuse the Allies, and knew, they could not all agree to accept either Part of the Alternative, and that *England* and *Holland* without the Emperor could not take *Spain* and the *Indies*, were they never so much inclin'd to it. For had the Allies hearken'd to this Proposal, it had been in the Power of the *French* to have clos'd with which they wou'd. Now 'tis easy to see what this must have ended in: For in such a Partition, there is no doubt, but as the *Dutch* and we should have been for *Spain* and the *Indies*, 'tis as plain, the Emperor would have made the other Part his Choice, which is evidently best for him. Which Part now of the Allies in this Division would *France* be most willing to comply with? or in other Words, which Part of the Monarchy would they chose of the two to quit? A Man must be blind not to see, that the Part the Emperor would like best to have, the same *France* would like best to part with: Behold then the necessary Consequence of heark'ning to such Terms; the Confederacy broken, and the Maritime Powers left to shift for themselves, without being able to obtain either of the Parts, when they ought to be content, according to the Terms of the Grand Alliance, with nothing less than both.

Who now, I would fain know, have most Reason to complain that these Offers were re-

jected, the People of *London* or *Vienna?* They who might have had the Part they had moſt mind to, if they would have abandon'd their Allies, or we, who 'tis certain, beſides the Infamy of ſo baſe an Action, could have had nothing? Had the Writers, who are ſo able at making Something out of Nothing, had their Lot in *Auſtrian* Ground, what a Field had there been for them? What rare Matter to ſhew their Skill in? What ſpecious Pretences, without the help of *Secret Hiſtory*, to give out, that the Emperor was ill adviſ'd? What! reject ſo advantageous an Offer, by which ſo great an Addition of real Strength would have been made to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and that at a Time, when they were ſo unable to carry on the War, when the People have been exhauſted with continual Wars for more than Thirty Years! When the *Malecontents* are at the Gates of the Capitol! When the King of *Sweden* inſults in that outrageous manner, the *Imperial* Dignity, and every Minute threatens an Invaſion! Is that a Time to reject ſo Good a Peace, and hazard the Safety of the Empire in Complement to the Maritime Powers? What wicked Counſellors muſt theſe be, who can adviſe at this rate? Is it not plain they are falſe, and in ſome other Intereſt, or that they mind nothing elſe but making their own Fortunes, when they act ſo manifeſtly againſt the Welfare and Honour of the *Imperial* Family, and ſhew they have no Regard to the Safety even of the Empire? Would not this be the Language of the Faction, if the Scene were chang'd from

from *London* to *Vienna?* And yet we don't hear, that either the Emperor or his People, have hitherto thought it any Crime in the Miniſters, who would not hearken to thoſe Terms; inſtead of that, all the World think it much for their Honour, that they have appear'd true to themſelves, and faithful to their Allies, in rejecting ſo pitiful and inſecure a Peace.

And is not this a Reproach to us, who ſuffer our ſelves to be deluded by ſuch vile Impoſters, who would perſwade us out of our Senſes, that Half the *Spaniſh* Monarchy is as good as the Whole, and that Nothing is as good as Half. For I have ſhewn you, that one Half only was offer'd, and that even that could not be had. It muſt ſure, to all Thinking Men, be very ſurprizing, that we only of all the Allies ſhou'd complain that this ridiculous Offer of the *French* was rejected, when we of all of them have moſt reaſon to be pleas'd with it: There muſt needs be ſome Secret in it above the reach of common Senſe, that all of a ſudden this ſhou'd be made a Capital Crime in our Miniſters, their not doing Three Years ago that, which if they had done, we ſhould all before now have thought they deſerv'd to loſe their Heads for.

I believe you begin to be tir'd with this Article, and would be content I ſhould ſay no more in ſo plain a Caſe, after ſuch a Diſcovery of the Impudence of theſe State Mountebanks, who would have perſwaded us, that we were dangerouſly ill, when we ſaw and felt our ſelves to be very well; and that we

were all undone, if we did not leave the skilful and able Hands we had long us'd with so much Success, to try their boasted Medicines, when we were not in the least want of them. No body, if you will believe them, have such universal Remedies for all the Evils of the State as they; and under this popular Pretence of curing the Nation, they take all the Pains they can to poison it; of which I have already given you one Example; you shall have more in what follows.

But before I dismiss this Subject, I must beg leave to observe one thing farther, which is of too much moment to be past over; and that is, That they who have done their Country so much Service in rejecting this Offer from the *French*, would have done it still much greater, could they have prevented any Regard being given to it. For tho' the refusing these Terms could do no harm, the hearkning to them I will shew you did a great deal. The Inclination some People of the same Complexion with the Author of the *Secret History*, express'd to come to a Treaty with the *French* upon the Terms offer'd, rais'd in the *Imperial* Court a great Jealousy, that the Maritime Powers were tampering with *France*, and making Terms for themselves, to which the Interest of the House of *Austria* was to be sacrific'd: This put that Court upon Measures that had a fatal Influence on the next Campaign, and occasion'd the two most unfortunate Events that have happen'd all this War. First, This Suspicion made them begin and conclude a Treaty with the *French* for evacuating the

*Mila-*

*Milaneſe*, without the Privity of *England* and *Holland*, who did not know one Word of the Matter. And what do you think was the Conſequence of this? Why, it gave the *French* an Opportunity of ſending immediately into *Spain* a great Body of good Veteran Troops; and 'tis to this Reinforcement ſent the Duke of *Anjou*, that we owe the Loſs of the Battle of *Almanza*, which prov'd ſo fatal to our Affairs on that Side; if thoſe Troops had not joyn'd, we had been Superior to the Enemy, and that Battle had either not been fought, or it had been won, and *Spain* with it, conſidering the ill Condition the Duke of *Anjou*'s Affairs were then in; and the true Reaſon we ventur'd that Battle, was to prevent the Junction, which we did not know, or at leaſt did not believe, was made at the Time we fought; a Miſtake, we may think, very eaſily made in *Spain*, when 'tis known, we owe the Victory of *Ramellies* to the *French* making the very ſame Miſtake in *Flanders*, where they thought the *Engliſh* had not at that Time joyn'd the Confederate Army, and reckon'd for certain that the *Danes* at leaſt, neither had, nor could: And this Perſwaſion made them venture a Battle, which the *French* have ſo much reaſon to remember, without waiting for a conſiderable Body of Troops, that were coming to them from the *Rhine*, the Head of which were actually at *Namur*, when Monſieur *Villeroy* began his March towards the Confederates. But to return, 'tis plain the *French* had not gain'd the Battle of *Almanza* without that Reinforcement from *Italy*, and even with it,

tho'

tho' the Battle was fought in *April*, and our Army was in a manner ruin'd by that Blow, all they did that Year, was only to take *Lerida*. But that Reinforcement could not have been sent, had not the Secret Treaty for the Evacuation of the *Milaneſe* been made; and the Treaty had not been made, had not the Jealouſy rais'd in the Imperial Court, by the Inclination of ſome People, expreſs'd to hearken to the Offer of the *French*, made them reſolve upon ſecuring ſomething for themſelves. And the ſame Jealouſy put them upon taking another Step, no leſs prejudicial to the common Cauſe; and that was the Expedition to *Naples*, which they could not be prevail'd with to defer upon the repeated and moſt preſſing Inſtances that the Maritime Powers made to them by their Miniſters, both at *Vienna* and *Italy*. And the Conſequence of the Expedition was, that it not only diverted a great part of the Troops, that were to execute the Project on *Toulon*, but retarded for a conſiderable time the March of the reſt; and this Loſs of Time, and leſſening of their Numbers, ſeem to have been the chief Occaſions of the Miſcarriage of that glorious Enterprize. Nothing made the Imperial Court ſo obſtinately bent on that unhappy Expedition, but the Fears they had, that *Naples* as well as *Milan*, would at the *Hague* be given up to facilitate a Peace, which they were reſolv'd to prevent, by getting Poſſeſſion as ſoon as they could. This is all we have got by hearkning to thoſe Offers, which 'tis now thought a great Crime

we

we did not close with; the Loss of the Battle of *Almanza*, and the Miscarriage of the Project on *Toulon*, the greatest, most important, best concerted Enterprize that was ever entred on. And both these Misfortunes had in all Probability been prevented, had the Offers of the *French* been roundly rejected at the first, and no Occasion of Jealousy had, by listning to them, been given the Imperial Court. This is all plain naked Truth and Fact, which these Writers, or those at least that dictate to them, know as certainly, as they do, that two and two make four; and if they have any Modesty, they will blush when you let them see their Inventions thus expos'd.

After saying so much of that Part of the Offer the *French* made, which concerns the Partition they propos'd of the *Spanish* Monarchy, which we ought not to have accepted if we could, and could not if we would; there is no need of telling you, what Barrier was offer'd for the *Netherlands*, which the *Dutch* were most concern'd in, who don't use to neglect good Offers to come at Peace, if we may believe the Faction, who have for a long time pretended to fear nothing so much, as their quitting the Alliance for their own separate Interest. Tho' now the noble Firmness they have shewn in adhering to it, till Terms may be had to the Satisfaction of all Parties, is by these ill designing Politicians, who can take every thing by a wrong Handle, imputed to them for a Crime; a Crime perhaps, that they may not be guilty of much longer; or if they are, 'tis not for want of some Mens taking the most effectual Methods to cure them

them of a Fault, which I don't remember they were ever before blam'd for.

That this is the whole Truth of this Matter, that these and no other, were the Offers the *French* made after the *Ramellies* Campaign; I will give you, besides those already hinted at, one plain authentick Proof, which is as good as a thousand Demonstrations, and that is a Letter of the *French* King to the Pope, on this Subject, writ in the following Spring, when all Thoughts of Peace were at an end, and a new Campaign was entring upon.

This Letter may be found in the *Mercure Historique & Politique, Tom.* 43. *pag.* 33. and here follows a Translation of it.

## Letter of the King of *France* to the Pope.

Dated at *Versailles*, 15 Feb. 1707.

*The Care which your Holiness continues to take for procuring the Peace of* Europe *is always equally agreeable to us. We have nothing more at Heart than to second your Endeavours, and we wou'd even prevent you in any thing we cou'd do to make them effectual. As it was not our Fault that the War was begun, so we shall seek Occasions to end it, by the most ready and easy Methods. Your Holiness has been inform'd, that we have already made frequent Advances to come to so wholesome an End. It can be attributed only to the Misfortune of the Times, that Catholick Princes, struck with a Fear of displeasing their Allies, shou'd yet refuse to hear*

*hear the holy Exhortations of the Vicar of Jesus Christ. When we left it to the Arbitration of your Holiness to satisfy the Rights and Demands of the Emperor, by a valuable Compensation, upon some Parts of the* Spanish *Monarchy: The Ministry of your Holiness were charg'd with the Care of making the Proposal of it to that Prince. But with what Haughtiness did he reject it! Having said Things exorbitant, and insolently demanded that our Grandson shou'd be recall'd. Who cou'd have thought, most holy Father, that he wou'd have made so arrogant a Return to an insulted King, to a Minister of your Holiness, and to our Love of Peace. For the Conjuncture, far from being favourable to the House of* Austria, *seem'd then to threaten it, by the Superiority of our Forces, and by our gaining the Battle of* Cassano. *But God, who is the Master of Events, chang'd the Posture of our Affairs. Yet tho' we were employ'd with the Cares of repairing our Losses, we had still in our Minds the Idea we had conceiv'd of Peace, at the time even of our greatest Prosperity.* We renew'd to *Holland* the Offer of a Barrier for their State, and of the Security demanded for their Trade; reserving it still to our selves to treat with the Emperor about a Compensation. *Propositions so reasonable were again rejected by the Intrigues of* that Party, which had shew'd it self averse to the Advancement of our Grandson: *And then we employ'd all our Thoughts to increase our Preparations for a War, which had been violently and unjustly declar'd against us.*

*Nevertheless as it becomes us to be obedient to the pious Exhortations of your Holiness: And to the End that our Enemies may have no pretence to impute to us the Loss of so much Christian Blood, as is al-*

 *ready*

*ready ſpilt, and now going to be let out, we will give your Holineſs a plain and frank Account of the Diſpoſition we are in for Peace. We will therefore acquaint your Holineſs, that the King our Grand-ſon, has intruſted us with full Power* to convey the Arch-Duke a Part of thoſe Eſtates that compoſe the *Spaniſh* Monarchy. *The Catholick King has the Hearts of the true Spaniards, and is content to reign over them.*

*It only depends therefore on the Emperor to explain himſelf at this time, who may have, if he pleaſes, for ever reunited to his Family,* The Milaneſe, Naples, *and* Sicily, *with the other Iſlands belonging to* Spain, *that are ſituate in the* Mediterranean *Sea.*

*We ſhould eaſily agree about* a Barrier for the Republick of the united Provinces: *And the Two Pretences for the War, being thus remov'd, it wou'd not be difficult to put an End to thoſe Misfortunes, which* Europe *has been ſo long oppreſs'd with.*

*We pray God that he will preſerve your Holineſs a great many Years in the Government of his Church.*

Your Devout Son,
the King of *France*
and *Navarre*,

S. Louis.

I ſhall leave it to your ſelf to make the Reflections which naturally ariſe from this Letter; and having thus plainly ſhewn you how groundleſs

leſs the firſt Complaint of theſe Writers is, I ſhall endeavour to prove to you with the ſame Clearneſs, that there is as little Ground for the next, which is this:

2. That the War in *Spain* has been ſhamefully neglected, tho' the Recovery of that Kingdom was the chief thing we propos'd by entring into the War.

This is the moſt plauſible of all their Complaints, and yet I doubt not but I ſhall eaſily convince you, that it has, if poſſible, leſs Senſe in it than any of the reſt. We that live at home have for the moſt Part, no other Way to judge of Affairs abroad, but by Events; and things having ſucceeded but ill on the Side of *Spain*, or at leaſt very ſhort of the Expectations we were fill'd with, that a Revolution there might be compaſs'd with as little Trouble as it was here, we readily give into any Inſinuations or Surmiſes, be they never ſo groundleſs or extravagant, that impute the Event we did not expect, to ill Conduct or Miſmanagement; 'tis the Nature of Mankind, they would fain be knowing, or judging at leaſt, whether they know or not, which makes them catch at every Shadow of a Reaſon, to account for things, eſpecially when they don't go to their Mind; they take for granted, wherever there is want of Succeſs, there is a Fault; and 'tis ſome Amends they fancy for a Diſappointment, if they can firſt lay the Blame ſomewhere, no matter where: 'Tis this Humour makes this Complaint ſo popular; and when the Faction has given out that the War in *Spain* has been neglected, 'tis eaſily believ'd by thoſe that know no better: but a very little Examination will clear up this

Matter to the meaneſt Underſtanding.

This Complaint muſt mean one of theſe two Things, either that the Parliament has not been mov'd to make ſufficient Proviſion for the War in *Spain*, or that the Proviſion made by Parliament has been miſapply'd; and that either here at home, or by thoſe who have commanded the Forces that have been ſent thither. If the Parliament was not moved to make ſufficient Proviſion for the War in *Spain*, or there was any Neglect here at home, it will concern thoſe whom this Complaint comes from, to ſhew they had no Part in the Management they now complain of, or elſe they will come themſelves into ſome Part of the Blame; unleſs it can be prov'd that they made proper Remonſtrances againſt the Manner in which this War was carried on. If the Neglect was not here but in *Spain*, if they miſapply'd the Mony, and return'd falſe Muſters, or did not manage the Troops they had to the beſt Advantage, let thoſe who were entruſted with the Command there look to that. 'Tis a pretty great Preſumption, there was no Fault in what was to be done here at home, that they who in that Caſe had moſt Reaſon to complain, have been ſo ſilent, tho' it ſo highly concern'd them, for their own Honour, to remove the Blame of our ill Succeſſes from themſelves: But to come a little to Particulars. This Complaint is dated with one Conſent from the Battle of *Almanza*, and yet, in all Reaſon, they ought to have look'd back at leaſt one Year further: For 'tis yet a Secret how the mighty Advantage we had over the Enemy upon raiſing the Siege of *Barcelona* came to end as it did, when

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we had so fair a Prospect of making an entire Conquest of the whole Kingdom: Why don't they ask, What was the true Reason that oblig'd K. *Charles* to lose six Weeks at *Barcelona*, when he should have been hastening to *Madrid*? Why my Lord *G.* and the *Portuguese* General, who lay so long in the Neighbourhood of *Madrid*, could have no Intelligence from those who commanded in *Catalonia*? Why, when K. *Charles* did at last march to join the *Portuguese*, his Orders were not obey'd, when he desir'd that all the Troops that could be drawn together should be sent to reinforce those he had with him, which might have enabled him to give the *French* a Battle, and have ended the War on that side at once? And as to the whole Conduct of the War in *Catalonia*, to the End of that Year, why don't they ask, What Care was taken in transmitting Muster-Rolls, and what became of the Money issued for that Service? Why the Pay for full Companies was given to the Captains, when they had not ten, nay some not five Men in them; which made the *Spanish* Service so beneficial to the Officers, that they return'd home full of Money, a Thing very uncommon in Soldiers, and of which among the inferiour Officers in the *Flanders*-Army, 'tis not easie by all I have ever heard, to find a single Instance? One would think when so much Complaint is made upon this Subject, these were proper Points to be enquir'd into; which, as great a Secret as they are at present, may one Day be laid open, so as every body may be able to see what Neglect there has been, and whose Door it lies at: But to come to the Battle of *Almanza*, from which their Complaints

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are dated, what occasion'd the Loss of that Battle, or which comes to the same thing, what gave the *French* that great Superiority of Troops, I have told you before, it was the Reinforcement which the *French*, by the Evacuation of the *Milaneze*, were at Liberty to send from *Italy* to *Spain*; a Thing which in *England* we did not know till it was too late to fence against it. What Pains had been taken here at home, to enable K. *Charles* to recover the Ground he had lost, upon his Retreat from *Madrid*, has been so well shewn in an Answer I have read to that Part of *Faults on Both Sides* which relates to this Matter, that I shall beg Leave to refer the Reader to it.

As to the general Scheme of the War on that Side, and the Provision made for it, let those who clamour upon this Head shew us that they disapprov'd it, and let them tell us what they thought wrong, and how they would have had it mended, and then we may think for once there is some Sincerity in what they say; but till then I shall take Leave to suspect all they say on this Head is only an Invention to infuse groundless Prejudices into the People against their best Friends: And for my own part, I am fully perswaded that these Writers, or those at least whose Tools they are, have been long convinc'd, from all the Experience we have had of the *Spanish* War, and particularly from the Battle of *Almanza*, and what follow'd upon it, that the best thing for *England*, is to draw the War on that Side into the least Compass we conveniently can, and keep on the Defensive only, contenting our selves with maintaining the Footing we had got, without pretending

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to more than to be in a Readineſs to lay hold of any favourable Opportunity of Action, which either the Weakneſs or Negligence, or ill Conduct of the Enemy, might offer, or which we might be invited to by the Encouragement given us by thoſe that are in the *Auſtrian* Intereſt. This, I dare ſay, thoſe Gentlemen think is the true Foot we ſhould put the *Spaniſh* War upon: and that it ſhould be chiefly carried on by taking Foreign Troops into our Pay, and not employing our own Men, which can't be done without the greateſt Inconveniencies; beſides that, at this Time, they may, 'tis plain, be much more uſefully employed nearer home; and therefore I can think nothing to be farther from theſe Mens Thoughts than what is ſo much in their Mouths, that this War has been neglected, and that greater Proviſion ought to have been made for it: My Reaſon why I think them ſo inſincere, is plainly this, that they can't but know the great Difference there is between an Offenſive and Defenſive War, and that what they ſeem to contend for is impracticable, and the moſt effectual Way we can take, never to have what their Writers and their Friends pretend to be ſo mightily concern'd for; 'Tis ſo evident to all that know any thing of theſe Matters, upon how unequal a Foot the *French* and we muſt make an Offenſive War in that Country; But nothing can make this ſo plain as to put a Caſe to you.

Suppoſe then, to humour theſe Men, we were to ſend from hence an Augmentation of 20000 Men, or for our own Share 10000, to *Catalonia*, ſhall we not then have 10000 leſs in *Flanders*, and may not the *French* leſſen their Army

Army there by the ſame Number? Suppoſe then the *French* and we both would ſend an Augmentation of 10000 Men thither, let us ſee what will be the Conſequence: The Men we ſend will be tranſported at a very great Charge, and we can never make any tolerable Gueſs when they will come thither, and conſequently can be ſure of nothing, that depends upon their Arrival, which may be near a Twelvemonth from the Time they lay ready to embark; and when Deductions are made for Sickneſs and Deſertion, while they lie at *Portſmouth*, waiting for Ships and Winds; and for what Numbers of them may die at Sea, in ſo long a Paſſage, eſpecially if any malignant Diſtemper get among them, when we conſider how unable theſe Men will be for Service, upon landing after ſo long a Voyage, which will make it abſolutely neceſſary for them to go into Quarters of Refreſhment, before they take the Field; the Chance they have of arriving at the moſt unwholſome Seaſon of the Year, the Difference of that Climate from our own in all Seaſons, the Numbers that will be ſwept away by drinking immoderately the ſtrong *Spaniſh* Wines, which 'tis impoſſible to keep Men from, when they are eaſy to be come at, and the intemperate eating of rich Fruits, which are always very fatal to an Army; the many Men that will be loſt by *maroding* in a ſtrange Country, before they know where they are, a Word Soldiers are well acquainted with, and by which an Army loſes more Men than can be eaſily imagin'd by thoſe who are Strangers to theſe Matters; when all theſe things are conſider'd, after ſo much Expence and Time, I believe our 10000 at the

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End of two Months after their Arrival, will, upon a modeſt Computation, be found not to exceed 4000 Effective. Let us now ſee what will become of thoſe Men *France* ſends: They may be fetch'd from *Dauphine* and that Neighbourhood, and their Place may be ſupply'd from the *Rhine*, and theirs again from *Flanders*: They may be ſent at the moſt proper Seaſon of the Year; their March may be made in a Month or ſix Weeks; their Arrival may be known to a Day, and all things may be concerted againſt the Time they ſhall be fit to enter upon Action. Their Tranſportation coſts nothing, and when they arrive, they are what they ſet out, 10000 Men; and the Wines, and Fruits, and Climate, are ſo little different from their own, that 'tis very little they ſuffer from them. I may add, that their Religion procures them better Quarter from the Peaſants of the Country, than Hereticks can hope for, which makes no inconſiderable Difference: So that to *France* 'tis in a manner the ſame thing in all Reſpects to ſend Men to *Spain* as 'tis to *Flanders*; but to us, 'tis not only a vaſt Expence, but almoſt all to no Purpoſe.

But this is not all; I would ask theſe Gentlemen, how theſe Troops when they come to *Spain* ſhall ſubſiſt; how they ſhall get Horſes, or find Forage, or be provided with ſufficient Magazines? They that know any thing of *Spain*, can tell them (but I know they don't want to be told) that the Country is not able to ſubſiſt its own Inhabitants, much leſs an Army of Foreign Troops, thoſe Parts eſpecially that are in our Hands: And I have heard that one great Reaſon for venturing the Battle of *Al-*

*manza* was, that as few Troops as 'tis ſaid we had there, they were too many to ſubſiſt, and that they muſt have ſtarv'd if they had not fought. Now if the Country won't furniſh Neceſſaries, whence are they to be fetch'd? Why, either from *England* or *Italy*; except ſome ſmall Matter that may be had from the Coaſts of *Africk*. And is not this a pretty Method to ſubſiſt an Army? Ask thoſe who know any thing of our *Flanders*-Armies, what would become of them, if Bread and Forage were to be brought to them by Sea, from Places 30, 50, or 100 Leagues from them? Ask them, what Straits they are put to, when only a little Bad Weather has ſpoilt the Roads, tho' their Magazines be but four or five Leagues from them? Ask them, how inconvenient in general 'tis for them, when they can't be ſupply'd by Water with the Things they want, tho' *Flanders* be the fineſt Country in the World to ſubſiſt an Army in, 'tis ſo fruitful in Corn, ſo full of good Towns, and affords ſo great a Quantity of Wheel-Carriage. Ask but theſe Queſtions, and you will be preſently convinc'd, how difficult it muſt be to ſubſiſt an Army in *Catalonia*; when a great Part of their Subſiſtance muſt be brought by Sea, and from Places ſo remote; and the little the Country it ſelf affords, muſt be fetch'd often-times a great way, and over ſuch Mountains, as no Carriages can paſs; all muſt be brought by Mules, which coſt a great deal, and are not to be had for Money, in ſuch Numbers, as a very moderate Army has occaſion for. In ſhort, to ſubſiſt any Army in this Country is very difficult; they muſt often be in great danger of ſtarving, while they depend on Winds

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and Seas for their Provisions; and to subsist a great one, which these Gentlemen would seem to argue for, is absolutely impossible.

Let us now see how it stands with *France* in this Point: Even as well as they can wish; for 'tis a very short Passage from *Marseilles* and *Toulon* to *Roses* and other Ports on that side of *Spain*, and the Provinces of *France* that lye neareſt to their own Ports, are extreamly fruitful, so that Magazines may be erected in them with all the ease imaginable; and when the Winds won't let their Ships come out, which does not happen very often, they have a Reserve in Case of Necessity, and can supply their Troops by Land. Such a prodigious Advantage has *France* over us in making War on that side, even upon Supposition of maintaining but a moderate Army there, that shall act Offensively, and be to make great Marches in so barren a Country; and if we would send a great one thither, (not that I think any Army could be very great by the Time it was there) these Inconveniences would increase in a double Proportion at least; that is, sending twice the Number would be attended with four times the Disadvantages, thrice the Number with six times, and so on; but this is so plain, that I can't think it needs any farther Illustration: Need I add, how hard it is to recruit the Troops in this Service, which one may be sure finds no Voluntiers; and those the Law would give to it, will of two Evils be glad to choose the least, and to prevent being sent to *Spain*, will list themselves in any other Service. Besides, when these Recruits are rais'd, how shall they be sent? In small Numbers by the Packet-boats? But how often are

they taken? And when they come to *Lisbon*, how ſhall they get on to *Catalonia*? And if they are kept till they can have the Opportunity of a Convoy, how long will they be wanted, and how inſenſibly will they moulder away, while they lie expecting the Time they ſo little wiſh for? And is not this a bleſſed Place to puſh the War in, where a great Army can neither be had, nor ſubſiſted, nor recruited, without the utmoſt Difficulties, the greateſt Hazards, and perpetual Diſappointments? I know but one ſure Effect of ſuch a War, and that is, that were it conſtantly fed, it would ſoon eat up all our Men: For every twenty effective Men in *Spain*, *England* loſes at leaſt threeſcore: And our Treaſure iſſu'd for that Service, we ſhall have reaſon to think, ſinks in the ſame Proportion as our Men do, if we conſider the Expences of Tranſportation, and of Supplies ſent from hence, the Danger they go in from the Enemies Ships of War and Privateers, the Exchange of Money between *England* and *Genoa*, the exceſſive Price which Things will coſt that are bought there for *Catalonia* by the time they get thither, the Charge we are at to get Horſes for our Cavalry, which one with another, coſt as much as five ſent to *Flanders*. A ſlight View of theſe and the other neceſſary Articles, beſides the ſtanding vaſt Expence of maintaining ſo great a Part of our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, will eaſily ſhew you, that to extend this War would ſerve to little elſe but to exhauſt us of our Money, as well as Men. In ſhort, both Men and Money ſhrink almoſt to nothing, when they come thither, in compariſon of what they were

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when they went from us: From all which I can't but conclude, That nothing can be greater Nonsense, or rather greater Villany, than what these Writers, or those that direct them, tell us upon this Head: For they know all this to be true, that there is no Pretence for the Complaints they make of the War on this side having been neglected, but that on the contrary, nothing can be so ruinous to *England*, as the Measures they would hurry us into. We can't have a better View, with what a Disadvantage we make an Offensive War in *Spain*, than our Affairs there give us at this Time, when the greatest Advantages are lost, thro' the utter Inability we are in to support them; for we can neither send them timely Help, nor so much as know what it is they want. Which, by the way, is another Circumstance, that ought to cure us of our Fondness for this War. The *French* King can hear from thence in as few Days as we commonly do in Weeks; and that regularly; whereas we are always at Uncertainties. This we are all at present sensible of: The Impatience we have for these four Months and more been in, to know what our Friends are doing there, makes every body feel the Want we have of Inteiligence from those Parts; we know nothing but what the *French* are pleas'd to tell us, who won't lose, we may be sure, the Opportunity to impose upon us what they think most for their Purpose; which makes it impossible, even for the New M——— to take the proper Measures to support our Troops; tho' could we have known as much and as early as we would, all Relief from hence must have come too late to enable our Men

Men to keep the Ground they had with ſo much Glory gain'd; and thus it muſt always be, unleſs we could foreſee, ſome Time before, when a Battle will be loſt or won, and provide accordingly; otherwiſe every thing muſt come out of Time; while the *French*, in the mean while, have it in their Power to ſhape their Meaſures, as the Exigencies of Affairs require; of which we have ſeen a melancholy Inſtance in the Support they have given the D. of *Anjou*, when his Affairs ſeem'd to be deſperate and paſt Remedy. They can hear quickly, have the Means to ſupport him always near, and can concert things with that Exactneſs, as to make them all bear to a Point; whereas we can neither know nor do what we would, and the Uncertainty our Preparations are unavoidably attended with, makes it impoſſible to depend on them, or to concert any Meaſures againſt ſuch or ſuch a Time, if they muſt wait the Arrival of Succours or Supplies from *England* for their Execution. In a word, all things conſpire to make *Spain* the leaſt deſirable of all Places to puſh the War in; and one ought rather to wonder we have been able to maintain our Ground there ſo well, than complain that more has not been done, or pretend I know not what Neglects to account for it: The thing is ſo plain, it ſpeaks it ſelf; the *Dutch* are ſo convinc'd of it, that they have never, for theſe three Years paſt, been prevail'd with to ſend any freſh Troops thither; *England* only is to be perſwaded into theſe wiſe Meaſures, as if we could not be ruin'd faſt enough.

If you have any Doubts about the Truth of any thing I have ſaid on this Head, I will put you

you into a Way how you may eaſily inform your ſelf: Get a Sight of the Accounts of the ſeveral Embarkations that have been made for *Spain*, both before and ſince the Battle of *Almanza*, and obſerve the Diſtance of Time between the Encampments of the Troops to go on board, and their taking the Field in *Catalonia*: Inquire into the Numbers the Regiments conſiſted of when they march'd for theſe Encampments, and how ſtrong they were when they join'd our Army: Ask ſome of the Officers of the ſix Regiments that were broke into others, a little before the Battle of *Almanza*, how many private Men they left when they came away, and ſome of them will tell you, that their Regiments had not above 50 Men in them, and ſome not ſo many. I can't ſuppoſe you will pretend theſe Inconveniencies ariſe from any Neglect in the Admiralty, becauſe that is no Part of the Complaint theſe Gentlemen make, and you know the Sea Affairs have generally been in the ſame Hands which we are at preſent ſo much pleas'd with. If this be then a true State of this Matter, I can compare Mens being fond of enlarging the Scheme of the War in *Spain*, to nothing but to *Shakeſpear's ſtrange Alacrity in Sinking*; for ſink we ſhall, and that very faſt, if the Advice of theſe Writers be purſu'd.

But if this be the Caſe, you will ſay, Why then did we at firſt begin a War in *Catalonia*, or have not long ſince quitted it? This admits of a very eaſie Anſwer, if we look back into the Poſture of Affairs at that Time, and conſider what it was we propos'd by making War on that Side, and what were the true Reaſons that engag'd us in it: Such an Enquiry will ſhew you

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it was begun with the most promising Appearances in Favour of it, could we but succeed in the first Step; and tho' they have not answer'd our Expectations, yet when so good Footing was once got, we neither cou'd nor ought to have quitted our Ground. When the Forces which began that War were first embark'd, 'twas very difficult to determine at this distance, which was most for the Service of K. *Charles* and the Common Cause, to land in *Catalonia*, or attempt to give some Relief to the D. of *Savoy*, which he was at that time in the greatest Want of; the Decision of this was left to the two Kings of *Portugal* and *Spain*, and their Ministers, who were best able to judge what Part was best to take; and after the Matter had been thoroughly consider'd, 'twas resolv'd for *Catalonia*, upon the pressing Instances of K. *Charles*, and the many and repeated Assurances that had been given him of the good Dispositions of the *Spaniards* to declare for him, as soon as he should have any firm Footing in *Spain*, and be in a Condition to protect them. For we did not pretend to conquer *Spain*, or to force a Revolt upon them, but to favour one, supposing them inclin'd to it; and what made the Experiment the more worth trying, was the desperate Condition of Affairs in *Italy*, which this was thought the likeliest Way to give some Relief to, by obliging the *French* to take off a Part of that Weight of Troops with which the Duke of *Savoy* was so violently press'd: Besides, you may remember that at the Time this War in *Catalonia* was begun, we had not the least Prospect of making such mighty Conquests in *Flanders*, which was every Inch of it in the *French* Hands,

Hands; and 'twas more than any body cou'd tell, when it wou'd be otherwise, much less cou'd they hope to see any possibility of Penetrating into *France* on that side, which we have had since the *Ramellies* Campaign so fair a Prospect of. These Circumstances of Affairs, the Appearance there was of losing all in *Italy*, and of getting nothing in *Flanders*, made it very reasonable for us to try the Inclinations of the *Spaniards*; and had they answer'd better the Assurances that had been given, whatever Body of Troops had for once been carry'd thither, had doubtless been very well employ'd, to give them Countenance.

These were the Motives, upon which the War was begun on that side, and nothing but Experience could have convinc'd People, that *Spain* might not have been had for going for; especially when those who were presum'd to be the best Judges, were so sure of the Success; so that nothing could have justify'd our not making the Tryal; whatever had been said against it, would not have been believ'd, while the Inconveniences of this War had not yet been felt, and for that Reason could not be so certainly judg'd of.

These were great Inducements to try what might be done there, and the first Attempt met with Success; for the Enemy not being prepar'd for us, and the People on that side being pretty much in our Interest, *Barcelona* soon fell into our Hands, and all *Catalonia* with it; and we gain'd Footing enough to encourage a Revolt in the other Kingdoms, but not to force one, unless they had been more dispos'd to it

themſelves; in which Point no body wants to be told, they fail'd: But tho' this Conſequence, which we hop'd for from our Succeſs, did not follow from it, the Advantage we had gain'd was too conſiderable to be parted with; for by being Maſters of *Barcelona*, we kept up Life in our Friends, and gave a perpetual Alarm to our Enemies, who were by this Situation of ours, oblig'd to leſſen conſiderably their Army on the ſide of *Portugal*, which one might have expected would have turn'd to a better Account than it did, and wou'd have enabl'd the *Portugueſe* to have made ſome Impreſſion on *Spain*. But that is not all, as long as we had ſuch a Footing, and the Enemy could not depend on the Inclinations of the People to the Duke of *Anjou*, which by what they had ſeen in *Catalonia*, they had reaſon to be very apprehenſive of, they were forc'd to employ an Army, much ſuperiour to ours, to obſerve our Motions, not knowing to which ſide we might turn our ſelves, or where an Inſurrection might break out in favour of us. And beſides the Diſtraction, Uneaſineſs, and great Expence this new War created the Duke of *Anjou*, and his Adherents, it oblig'd him to diſcover his Diſtruſt of the *Spaniards* more than he had done before; and to ſhew, he thought himſelf ſafe only in *French* Armies, as well as *French* Councils; which could not but make a great deal of ill Blood, tho' not ſo much as might have been hop'd for from the old Spirit of that Nation. Theſe, you will allow, were no ſlight Reaſons for maintaining the Footing we had in *Catalonia*; much more will you think ſo, when you reflect, that this little Piece of *Spain* had four Years a-

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go let us into a full Poſſeſſion of the Whole, had not a moſt fatal and unaccountable Miſmanagement ruin'd all; not to inſiſt on ſeveral other good Effects; ſuch as keeping his Holineſs, and the other *Italian* Princes in awe, who diſcover'd but too much Inclination to a League with *France*, the alarming all the *Southern* Coaſt of *France*, and giving Encouragement to the *Sevennois*, and other New Converts, who had long ſhewn they would ſtir if they could; which created a freſh Trouble and Expence to the *French* King, by obliging him to keep Troops on that ſide, to no other end, but to obſerve the Motions of his own Subjects; and in the laſt Place, had it ſucceeded, 'tis to this we had ow'd the Whole of the Grand Project againſt *Toulon*. Theſe are ſuch Advantages of the *Spaniſh* War as will ſufficiently juſtify the beginning and purſuing of it in the manner we have done, eſpecially ſince the Reduction of *Minorca* has made it ſo ſafe and eaſy to keep a good Squadron all the Year in the *Mediterranian*. But theſe Purpoſes are all anſwer'd, while we confine that War within moderate Bounds, and pretend to keep on the Defenſive only. There is no need of enlarging the Scheme of the War, which inſtead of doing Service to the Common Cauſe, would make us loſe ſeveral of the Advantages we have by it, while it lies in a narrow Compaſs, and would endanger what we might maintain, while we extend our ſelves beyond our Strength, and graſp at more than we can hold; beſides the other great Inconveniences, which I have ſhewn you, muſt follow the making an Offenſive War on this ſide, which can never poſſibly ſucceed, unleſs the *Caſtilians* were

more our Friends, or more were to be expected from the *Portugueſe*. And even a Defenſive War, Experience has ſhewn us, is much better carry'd on by Foreign Troops, which not only ſpares our Men, but ſaves a great deal of Money, and is much more convenient for the Service, the Paſſage being ſo much ſhorter from *Italy* than it is from *England*. And yet we all ſee, that notwithſtanding the Endeavours to ſupport King *Charles* upon his late Victories, no Reinforcement has yet been ſent him, even from thence, as feaſable as it ſeems, and as great Occaſion as he has for them; and the Reinforcement that was laſt ſent, 'tis known did not arrive till the middle of *June*, tho' it was intended and order'd, that they ſhould be there in *January*. Thus difficult it has been to maintain this War on the Foot it has been hitherto upon; and from Experience we may be ſure, thus it will be, and worſe, proportionably worſe, as we enlarge it. And therefore I can't think, any body does in earneſt mean more, than to do what we deſign, without loſs of time, but not to deſign more than is abſolutely neceſſary, or to extend the Compaſs of the War.

But they tell us, there is a Neceſſity for it, and that *Spain* is not otherwiſe to be had: But why ſo? Have they never heard in Phyſick of ſuch a Term, as Revulſion, which teaches to remove the Evil from one part by proper Applications, not to the Part it ſelf, but to its Oppoſite? Or have they not ſo much Mechanicks, as Children can teach them, who if they would throw down *B*, which is at the Top of *A*, and out of their Reach, will preſent-

ly

ly try if they can't pull down *A:* They know almoſt by Inſtinct, that 'tis all one whether you pull down *B* directly, or that which ſupports it. And 'tis the ſame thing with *Spain*; if that Kingdom be ever recover'd, it muſt be by proper Applications to *France*. *France*, all the World ſees, is the Support of the Duke of *Anjou*, and if this Support be forc'd from him, he will as ſurely tumble, as if you cou'd pull him with your Hands from the Throne he has uſurp'd. Since therefore we can't reach him, we ſhould ſet our ſelves with all our Might to pull from him his Support, and then he muſt fall on courſe: How near we have been ſucceeding in this, you can't want to be told. And how it came not to be quite done, your Friends know without being told; and how much ſoever they may like the Reaſon of this, I'm perſwaded they don't much like to hear of it. And if *Spain* be not gain'd this way, one may without the Spirit of Prophecy foretel, it never will be gain'd at all.

Read now again theſe admi'rd Pamphlets, and when their general Declamations have amus'd you, and you begin to think there is ſomething in them, then turn to this true State of the Caſe, and the Miſt they have caſt before you will vaniſh; their Harangues will leave no more Impreſſion upon you, than the famous Doctor's Speech does upon thoſe that look into his Sermon. But inſtead of thoſe Impreſſions, I cannot but think there will remain upon your Mind, as there does on mine, an utter Deteſtation and Abhorrence of the black Villany and Malice ſome Men have us'd to

to ruin the Reputation of the ableſt and moſt faithful Miniſters, and to hazard every thing that is dear to us as *Engliſh-men* and Proteſtants, rather than not compaſs their own deſtructive Ends.

I remember, I have often thought, upon the late intended Invaſion of the Pretender, that it was on his part a very fooliſh Enterprize; for tho' it might anſwer the Purpoſes of *France*, and force us to an ill Peace, it could hardly fail to end in the Ruin of him and his Friends. And I am of the ſame Opinion with reſpect to our Domeſtick Invaders, if I may uſe that Expreſſion; the Publick indeed may ſuffer by them, as much as *France* can wiſh, but if it ſhould have the good Fortune to eſcape the Danger, it is threatned with; the Attempt that has been made upon it will, I am perſwaded, ſooner or later bring inevitable Ruin upon themſelves.

But we are both, I dare ſay, ſufficiently tir'd for one time; I ſhall therefore take leave of you for the preſent, with Aſſurances that you ſhall, in a very while time, hear again from,

*SIR*,

*Your moſt faithful,*
*Humble Servant.*

*Poſt-*

# *Postscript.*

SInce these Papers were in the Press, the ill News is come of a Battle lost in *Spain* after the Glorious Actions of *Almanara* and *Saragossa*; Two Victories so great in themselves, and in the Consequence of them, that they might have been decisive of the War, if the *Portuguese* had join'd; which I am very sorry they did not, for the sake of the common Cause, and even of the young General himself, so justly applauded for his fearless Zeal both in Fighting and Speaking for the Service of his Country. But tho' this unfortunate Battle has too much justify'd what I have said against enlarging the Scheme of the War in that Country, I still hope we may be in a Condition not much worse than last Year, and able to continue acting in the *Defensive* manner I have recommended.

N. B. *The* Second Letter *will be publish'd next* Saturday.

*FINIS.*

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